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ABSTRACT This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy 
of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I 
contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: 
multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that 
functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is 
quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the 
mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic 
metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but 
that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I 
conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who 
remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is 




Contemporary philosophy of mind tends to assume that any attempt to do justice to the 
autonomy of the mental is philosophically respectable only if it is compatible with the 
ontology of natural science. Consequently, the two most widespread forms of non-
reductivism, i.e. token physicalism and functionalism, either endorse a physicalist 
ontology (token physicalism) or claim to be compatible with it (functionalism). The goal 
of this paper is to outline a neglected alternative to non-reductivism in the philosophy of 
mind modelled on the idealist philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. The ancestry of this 
argument is Kantian, although Collingwood gives an interesting twist to Kant’s attempt 
to limit the claims of knowledge in order to make room for freedom. I will refer to this 
neglected alternative as a form of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. As an 
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attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, this 
neglected alternative bears some similarities to Davidson’s anomalous monism but differs 
from it in one important respect. Whereas anomalous monism rests on a layered view of 
science that prioritises the ontology of natural science, Collingwood’s defence of 
conceptual dualism is based on an argument that has its roots in idealist philosophy. The 
paper proceeds as follows. I begin by outlining two positions in the philosophy of mind 
that are allegedly compatible with the thesis of the autonomy of the mental: functionalism 
and anomalous monism. I then introduce Collingwood’s neglected alternative and argue 
that his version of idealism is better equipped to realise the goals pursued by Davidson. I 
claim that Davidson’s defence of the methodological autonomy of the mental fails 
because of his commitment to a physicalist metaphysics and that Collingwood’s marriage 
of conceptual idealism and neutral monism offers a much better prospect of success than 
Davidson’s defence of non-reductive physicalism. I conclude by suggesting that the 
internal inconsistencies in the position of non-reductive physicalism do not, by 
themselves, provide overwhelming reasons for choosing (reductive) physicalism over 
(conceptual) idealism and that the idealist alternative in the philosophy of mind should 
therefore be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a 
successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental to the physical is compatible with 
the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda. 
 
I 
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Much recent philosophy of mind has been concerned with the place of mind in nature. 
With the demise of the kind of physicalism advocated by Smart (1959) and Feigl (1958) 
and of Ryle’s logical behaviourism many philosophers have given up trying to reduce the 
mental to the physical and have started to find ways of accommodating the mind within a 
physical world. As a result, although most contemporary philosophers of mind accept the 
ontology of natural science, many believe physicalism to be compatible with the claim 
that no reduction of the mental to the physical is possible. The reduction attempted by 
Smart and Feigl’s “type” physicalism was empirical in character: they assumed that 
vernacular talk about the mental could be reduced, via empirically discoverable laws, to 
talk about the physical, in the same way in which water was found to be identical with 
H2O. Ryle’s logical behaviourism, on the other hand, sought to accomplish a semantic 
reduction of the mental to the behavioural by showing that talk about the mental is a 
covert way of speaking about the behavioural. The perceived failure of reductivism, 
whether logical or nomological, led many philosophers to pursue the naturalistic agenda 
in a subtler way, one that could be seen to do justice to the autonomy of the mental. In 
particular reductivism has come under attack from two different fronts. On the one hand, 
following Putnam (1975), functionalists have endorsed the multiple realisability thesis 
according to which mental phenomena can be realised in different kinds of physical 
systems. Functionalism was thought to deliver a blow to reductive physicalism insofar as 
it opened up the possibility that different kinds of physical organisms could instantiate 
the same kind of mental phenomena and consequently that mental types may not be 
coextensive with physical kinds.
2
 On the other hand, following Davidson (1980), 
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supervenience theorists have argued for the autonomy of the mental on the grounds that 
the sciences of mind, unlike those of nature, are intrinsically normative. Although both 
functionalism and anomalous monism accept token rather than type physicalism and 
claim, for this reason, to endorse a form of non-reductive physicalism, their respective 
defences of the autonomy of the mental have very different motivations.  
Functionalists view mental phenomena as the intermediary link between 
environmental stimuli and behavioural responses of a given kind and clearly regard such 
phenomena as the kind of things that are susceptible to empirical investigation. However, 
they also want to enable sciences such as psychology to articulate explanatory hypotheses 
that employ their own vocabulary and concepts, concepts such as that of pain rather than 
that of C fibres or the firing of neurons. Functionalists, in other words, do not question 
the possibility of articulating an empirical theory of the mind; they simply want to 
formulate explanatory hypotheses that use the vocabulary of psychology rather than that 
of physics or neuroscience. Davidson’s anomalous monism, by contrast, is inspired by 
the problem raised by Kant’s antinomy of freedom and determinism: how can we 
reconcile the claims of freedom with those of nature? Kant proffered transcendental 
idealism as an answer. He regarded causes as constitutive of our empirical knowledge of 
nature rather than as something metaphysically real, thereby leaving open the possibility 
that things as they are in themselves may be governed by the causality of reason: he 
limited the claims of knowledge to explain how freedom is possible. Davidson seeks to 
answer the Kantian antinomy not by limiting the explanatory framework of natural 
science exclusively to phenomena, but by wedding a metaphysical commitment to 
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physicalism with a defence of the methodological autonomy of the mental. Both 
functionalists, who believe in physical multirealisability, and anomalous monists like 
Davidson, have endorsed token rather than type physicalism, i.e. the claim that whereas 
all mental phenomena are physically instantiated, there are no empirical laws to bridge 
the two domains. In other words, they have embraced physicalism whilst rejecting 
reductivism. Their motivation, however, is profoundly different. Functionalists are quite 
comfortable with the claim that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the 
mind: functionalism propounds an empirical theory of the mind articulated in terms of the 
vocabulary of vernacular psychology.  Anomalous monism, by contrast, denies that an 
empirical science of the mind is possible by appealing to the Kantian insight that the 
domain of the mental has a normative dimension that is completely absent from the 
physical. The autonomy that Davidson seeks to defend, therefore, is a much stronger kind 
of autonomy. It is not simply the case that the vocabulary of natural science and that of 
common sense psychology are different, as functionalists claim: the mind/matter 
distinction, for Davidson, as indeed for Kant, maps onto the is/ought divide. The 
difference between folk psychology and neuroscience is therefore not just one of 
vocabulary. It is a methodological difference. 
To be sure, Davidson provides a rather unkantian answer to a Kantian problem. 
Kant acknowledged that rational considerations “determine” actions in a very different 
sense from that in which empirical laws “determine” the occurrence of events in nature. 
The former prescribe a course of action, whereas the latter describe the course of events. 
Kant thought that the claims of theoretical as well as those of practical reason could be 
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vindicated by keeping the domain of reasons and that of causes quite separate from one 
another. Hence, in the Groundwork, he sought to avoid what have become known as the 
problems of downward mental causation and of explanatory exclusion by refusing to 
account for how psychophysical interactionism is possible and by arguing instead that the 
possibility of freedom rests on our ability to conceive of ourselves as members of an 
intelligible world. Kant acknowledged that the problems of downward mental causation 
and of explanatory exclusion arise from the demand that reasons should be causally 
efficacious over and above being rationally compelling and sought to avoid such 
problems by distinguishing between the phenomenal and the noumenal or intelligible 
realm. This separation, for Kant, is not a straightforwardly metaphysical one. A different 
ontology must
3
 be presupposed in order for practical reason to be possible, but the claim 
that there is an intelligible world is a postulate of reason, not a metaphysical fact of the 
matter.  
Davidson, like Kant, acknowledges that there are fundamental methodological 
differences between the mental and the physical domains but openly declares his 
allegiance to the one and only ontology, that of natural science, and endeavours to defend 
the methodological autonomy of the mental within the constraints of a physicalist 
ontology. Whereas Kant sought to defend the autonomy of the mental within the 
framework of a metaphysics of experience, Davidson seeks to defend the autonomy of 
the mental within the framework of a physicalist metaphysics. Davidson’s anomalous 
monism therefore seeks to retain Kant’s methodological dualism whilst jettisoning his 
transcendental idealism. Kant’s transcendental idealism barred the possibility of 
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answering metaphysical questions about the ultimate structure of reality. Davidson by 
contrast begins with a metaphysical commitment to the ontology of natural science and 
then grafts methodological dualism onto it. From this metaphysical platform Davidson 
proceeds to answer the objection that the methodological autonomy of the mental 
threatens the completeness of physical explanations by claiming that mental phenomena 
can indeed cause physical ones but only in so far as they are brought under a physical 
description.  
In sum, the main challenge to reductivism has come either from functionalists 
who have endorsed the multiple realisability thesis or from supervenience theorists 
inspired by Davidson’s anomalous monism. Functionalism defends the autonomy of the 
mental only in the very minimal sense that it permits sciences such as psychology to 
formulate explanatory hypotheses that employ common sense psychological vocabulary. 
But it does not challenge the idea of methodological unity since it is completely at ease 
with the view that it is the task of a science of mind to investigate empirical correlations 
between environmental inputs, mental phenomena and behavioural outputs.
4
 It is 
Davidson who has challenged the idea of methodological unity
5
 by arguing that the 
distinction between the mental and the physical coincides with the is/ought distinction.  
Anomalous monism’s argument against reductivism is that since the mind/matter 
distinction cuts across the is/ought divide, to reduce the mental to the physical by means 
of bridge laws would be equivalent to reducing the normative to the descriptive, and that, 
as Davidson says, “there is good reason to believe it cannot be done”.6 Many have 
remained unconvinced by Davidson’s attempt to graft methodological dualism onto the 
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ontology of natural science. It has been pointed out, for instance, that Davidson fails to 
meet the charge of epiphenomenalism and that his attempt to accommodate the thesis of 
the autonomy of the mental within a naturalistic agenda cannot succeed. Such concerns 
arise primarily from the consideration that if reasons do no explanatory work at the 
relevant level, i.e. the metaphysical level, they remain causally inert. Davidson’s 
anomalous monism, in other words, remains trapped between the Scylla of 
epiphenomenalism and the Charybdis of explanatory exclusion: reasons either remain 
causally inert qua reasons or they are causally efficacious qua reasons, in which case they 
threaten the claim of physics to provide a complete explanation of reality. Hence they are 
either epiphenomenal or incompatible with the metaphysics of natural science.
7
 But I will 
return to these objections later in section three. My task now is to articulate what I have 
referred to as a neglected alternative to non-reductivism. This alternative, which I argue 
is aptly represented by the philosophy of R.G. Collingwood, not only revisits the Kantian 
question, as indeed Davidson does, but also seeks to provide an answer which is 
ultimately much truer to the spirit of Kantian idealism. 
 
II 
Like Davidson, Collingwood thinks the mind-body problem is one that arises from the 
relationship between normative and descriptive discourses.
8
 To defend the autonomy of 
the mental is therefore not merely to articulate a causal theory of the mind in the 
vocabulary of folk psychology rather than that of neurophysiology, as functionalism 
would have it; it is to argue for the existence of fundamental methodological differences 
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between the sciences of nature and the sciences of mind. Unlike Davidson, however, 
Collingwood does not wish to characterise the relationship between the physical and the 
mental as a relationship of supervenience. This is because he believes there is a deeper 
link between methodological and ontological questions than Davidson allows. For 
Collingwood the method of a science determines its subject matter or “regional 
ontology”.9 Hence the science of mind is concerned with actions because it investigates 
what exists as a manifestation of rational processes. The sciences of nature, by contrast, 
are concerned with events because they describe what is as a manifestation of natural 
laws. To declare one’s allegiance to physicalist ontology unconditionally or 
independently of the set of heuristic principles which guide the sciences of nature, as 
Davidson does, is mistakenly to grant metaphysical status to what is merely the subject 
matter of natural science. Physicalism, for Collingwood, is not the one and only ontology, 
but simply the regional ontology of natural science. Thus Collingwood not only argues 
for the non-reducibility of normative to descriptive claims, as Davidson does; he also 
rejects the view that there is a level of explanation that has ontological priority and with it 
the layered view of science that underpins the supervenience/subvenience relation.
10
  
The claim that for Collingwood there is deeper link between methodology and 
ontology should be assessed with due care: Collingwood is not advocating a return to 
Cartesian or substance dualism. He merely claims that there is a link between one’s 
methodology and one’s ontology in the sense that method determines subject matter. 
There is, for Collingwood, no link between methodology and metaphysics properly 
speaking because the study of what is or exists (ontology traditionally understood) cannot 
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be carried out independently of the investigative goals of different sciences. In other 
words, whereas it is legitimate to ask what exists for the historian (actions) and what 
exists for the natural scientist (events), there is no answer to the question about what 
exists in general, outside the parameters of any specific investigation. Since Collingwood 
closely links the method of a science to its subject matter, he rules out the possibility that 
one could address the metaphysical question about what exists independently of the 
methodological question about how we come to know it. 
Collingwood makes this point by claiming that there are three kinds of 
explanation (he refers to these as three senses of the term “cause”), which correspond to 
the investigative goals of different sciences. Explanations of actions make use of what he 
calls causation in sense I. In sense I to cause means to afford a motive. In so far as action 
explanations make sense of causes in sense I, they establish a teleological connection 
between the explanans and the explanandum. This is the concept of causation employed 
in the sciences of mind. Explanations of events which are in one’s power to prevent or 
produce make use of what he refers to as causes in sense II. In sense II causes are like 
handles. This is the concept of causation used in the practical sciences of nature such as 
medicine and engineering. Explanations of events that are beyond one’s power to prevent 
or produce make use of a different concept of causation (sense III). This is the sense of 
causation at work in the theoretical sciences of nature, such as physics. In claiming that 
explanations in the historical, practical and theoretical sciences of nature make use of 
three different senses of the term cause, Collingwood is making the point that the three 
concepts of causation are species of the same genus, i.e. that they are all forms of 
This is a preprint of an article submitted for consideration in the Inquiry © 2005 [copyright Taylor & 
Francis]; Inquiry is available online at: www.tandfonline.com  
http://tandfprod.literatumonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00201740500241847   
 
Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind, D'ORO G, Inquiry 48(5):395-412 Oct 2005 
 
 11 
explanation. His interlinking of methodology and ontology entails the view that the 
distinction between so-called reasons and causes is a distinction between the a priori 
categories that govern the study of mind and nature respectively, and that the 
corresponding distinction between rational and causal explanations is a methodological 
distinction or a distinction between kinds of explanation, not a distinction between 
explanations that have and do not have ontological or existential import.  
This claim is clearly at odds with contemporary orthodoxy in the philosophy of 
mind. In contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind the question concerning the 
relationship between what Collingwood calls different senses of the term cause is framed 
not in answer to a conceptual question (what is the nature of action explanation?) but in 
answer to a metaphysical concern (can rationalising explanation have ontological import 
and if so what consequences does this have for the physicalist’s claim to causal closure?). 
It is therefore not uncommon to criticise the methodological discussion of the 
action/event distinction characteristic of philosophy of social science in the 1950s and 
1960s
11
 on the grounds that it displays a rather cavalier attitude to metaphysics. Kim, for 
instance, dismisses attempts that seek to solve the problem of mind-body dualism by 
arguing for the logical independence of rational and causal explanations as mere 
“deflationary approaches” or “free lunch” solutions12. Crane echoes this criticism by 
arguing that the debate concerning the possibility of mental causation is a debate about 
causation, not explanation. For Crane those who claim that scientific and mentalistic 
explanations do not conflict, because they are logically independent,
13
 simply fail to 
understand that the question concerning the possibility of mental causation is not a 
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methodological question about the logical form of action explanation but a metaphysical 
question about the possibility of overdetermination by mental and physical causes.
14
 
Construed metaphysically, the question “how is mental causation possible?” asks not 
“what is the logical structure of mentalistic explanations and how do they differ from 
explanations in natural science?” but “how is causal overdetermination by the mental and 
the physical possible?”15  
Collingwood’s approach differs from most contemporary treatments of non-
reductivism. The latter, as we have seen, seek to account for the autonomy of the mental 
within the framework of a naturalistic agenda that requires them to grant special 
metaphysical status to the kind of explanations employed in natural science. Following 
Kant’s lead, by contrast, Collingwood takes the concepts of action and event to be the a 
priori categories governing the investigation of mind and nature respectively.  
There are, however, a number of important respects in which Collingwood’s 
defence of the autonomy of the mental differs from Kant’s and it is important to 
acknowledge them. Collingwood carries Kant’s epistemological reform of metaphysics a 
step further by denying even the logical possibility of knowing things as they are in 
themselves. Against Kant’s claim that things as they are in themselves could only be 
known by an intellectus archetypus, Collingwood states that they are not simply 
unknown to beings which lack the faculty of intellectual intuition, but that they are 
unknowable in principle. This is what he means by claiming that there can be no science 
of pure being. Collingwood understands the word “science” in the Latin sense of the term 
scientia to mean a body of knowledge with a specific method. On this understanding of 
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the term there can be no science without a set of presuppositions or methodological 
assumptions and hence no science of pure being or ontology in the traditional sense of the 
word. Metaphysics can only take the form of an enquiry into regional ontologies or the 
heuristic principles governing first order sciences. This radicalisation of Kant’s 
epistemological reform of metaphysics has an important implication. Unlike Kant, 
Collingwood makes no distinction between the constitutive and regulative uses of reason. 
The distinction between theoretical and practical reason, for Collingwood, is not a 
distinction between judgements which possess and judgements which lack objective 
validity or existential import, but a distinction between logical forms that enable us to 
individuate particulars either as actions or as events. When we describe an occurrence as 
an expression of thought we identify it as an action, in the same way in which when we 
describe an occurrence in causal terms we identify it as an event. Collingwood does not 
claim that whereas events occur in space and time, actions do not, and consequently that 
action explanations, unlike event explanations, are mere rationalisations lacking 
ontological or existential import. Since Collingwood rejects Kant’s view that whereas 
theoretical judgements are constitutive, practical ones are merely regulative, he does not 
rest his defence of the possibility of practical reason on the claim that action explanations 
have no application to spatio-temporal particulars and consequently that, if true, could be 
true only of an intelligible reality. As Collingwood puts it in An Essay on Metaphysics, 
the different notions of causality that regulate investigations in the sciences of mind and 
in the practical and theoretical sciences of nature are absolute presuppositions or heuristic 
principles which cannot be justified empirically by asking whether they fit with what 
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exists. Their justification is to be sought in the fact that they make different forms of 
investigation possible in the first place. The concept of truth and falsity applies only to 
what he calls relative presuppositions, i.e. presuppositions internal to a given form of 
enquiry. Hence, for instance, whereas the (relative) presupposition that the cause of 
malaria is the bite of a mosquito may be either true of false, the (absolute) presupposition 
that illness may be either prevented or produced by creating or eliminating certain 
antecedent conditions (causation in sense II) is neither true nor false but a pre-condition 
for carrying out the form of enquiry within which true or false claims can be advanced. 
Collingwood’s radicalisation of Kant’s epistemological reform of metaphysics 
thus entails that we can ascribe the concept of action to spatio-temporal particulars in the 
way in which we can ascribe the concept of event to particular things. We could describe 
x either as “the opening of a window” with reference to a motive (for example, letting air 
in) or as the movement of the biceps and both descriptions could be true of the same 
particular. The reason why action and event explanations could be true of the same 
particulars is that the concepts of action and of event are not class or empirical concepts 
which carve out a part of reality but higher level concepts that determine a priori what 
kind of reality one is talking about. In other words, the concepts of action and of event, 
for Collingwood, do not stand to one another as the concepts of red and blue. Blue and 
red are species of the empirical genus colour. As species of an empirical genus they carve 
out a part of reality and, as such, cannot coincide in their instances. What is red cannot be 
blue and so on. The description of what occurs as either an action or as an event, by 
contrast, does not rest on an empirical classification since the ability to distinguish 
This is a preprint of an article submitted for consideration in the Inquiry © 2005 [copyright Taylor & 
Francis]; Inquiry is available online at: www.tandfonline.com  
http://tandfprod.literatumonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00201740500241847   
 
Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind, D'ORO G, Inquiry 48(5):395-412 Oct 2005 
 
 15 
semantically between the concept of an action and that of an event is a precondition for 
identifying a particular occurrence as an instance of either one or the other. Collingwood 
(1929) makes this point in his Lectures on Moral Philosophy where he claims that 
whereas a geologist can teach the distinction between sedimentary and crystalline rocks 
by pointing to instances of each, the moral philosopher cannot teach the distinction 
between the principle of duty and that of utility by pointing to dutiful actions and 
prudential actions because an action which is carried out for prudential considerations 
could also illustrate the principle of duty. The action/event distinction is rather like the 
distinction between the principle of duty and of utility. It is a distinction to which there 
corresponds no empirical difference.
16
 It is because the concepts of action and of event 
are not empirical but meta-level concepts that it is possible for the domain of enquiry of 
the sciences of mind and nature to overlap and for action and event explanations to be 
true of the same particulars in space and time. To illustrate this point Collingwood cites 
Aristotle’s formula of the overlap of classes according to which “two concepts ‘are the 
same thing’ in the sense that a thing which exemplifies the one exemplifies the other also, 
but ‘their being is not the same’ in the sense that being an instance of the one is not the 
same as being an instance of the other” (EPM, 50). In one sense of “being”, actions and 
events are the same thing; in another sense of being, they are not. They are the same 
because they overlap extensionally. They are not the same because they are intensionally 
distinct, because we mean different things when we characterise an occurrence as an 
action and when we characterise it as an event. The problem of explanatory exclusion, for 
Collingwood, arises only if one construes the action/event distinction as an empirical 
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classification. Once the action/event distinction is construed as an empirical 
classification, it becomes impossible to understand how different sciences can study the 
same things, i.e. the same particulars, whilst having very different subject matters or 
domains of enquiry. 
 But can Collingwood’s conceptual idealism really succeed in defending an 
alternative to Kant’s transcendental idealism and Davidson’s anomalous monism? In 
other words, can Collingwood’s conceptual idealism avoid the Kantian strategy of 
relegating the causal efficacy of practical reasons to the noumenal world, without facing 
the objection of epiphenomenalism that is so often raised against Davidson’s attempt to 
defend the autonomy of the mental in the context of a monistic ontology? 
One reason to suspect that Collingwood may be unable to evade the 
epiphenomenalist objection raised against Davidson is that in the reasons/causes debate 
prior to Davidson’s 1963 paper17 it was customary to defend the autonomy of action from 
event explanations by claiming that the former, unlike the latter, are ex post facto 
rationalisations that yield no predictions (or retrodictions). It was assumed that if action 
explanations could yield predictions, there would be no difference between the sciences 
of mind and nature. In turn, the view that action explanations differ from event 
explanations because they yield no predictions was based on a commitment to a Humean 
epistemology.  In other words, the view that action explanations differ from event 
explanations because the latter have predictive power (and hence existential import) 
whereas the former do not, relied on locating the reasons/causes distinction on either side 
of the Humean fork. This is not Collingwood’s strategy. The reasons/causes distinction, 
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for Collingwood, is not a Humean distinction between relations of ideas and matters of 
fact but (for lack of a better expression) a distinction of fundamental ontology, i.e. a 
distinction between concepts that determine a priori the subject matters of the sciences of 
nature and mind or, as he puts it in An Essay on Metaphysics, between different meanings 
of the term “cause”.  
To understand how Collingwood can avoid the twin dangers of explanatory 
exclusion and of epiphenomenalism we need to be clear about the exact nature of the 
conceptual idealism he seeks to defend.
18
 Like Davidson, Collingwood seeks to graft 
conceptual idealism (or pluralism) onto a monistic ontology. But unlike Davidson 
Collingwood is not a physicalist but a neutral monist. Let me elaborate on both the 
similarities and differences between Collingwood and Davidson’s positions. 
As we have seen, both Davidson and Collingwood believe that there are key 
methodological differences between the sciences of nature and mind.
19
 This is what they 
have in common. But whereas Davidson belongs to a Lockean tradition which sees 
philosophy as the under-labourer of science and consequently believes its task to be that 
of explaining how such methodological distinctions can be reconciled with the ontology 
of natural science, Collingwood belongs to a Kantian tradition which sees philosophy as 
providing a second-order reflection upon first order knowledge and as offering a meta-
level perspective from which to view natural science. As such Collingwood views the 
task of philosophy to be not that of showing how the action/event distinction may be 
reconciled with a scientific world view, but rather that of showing how incompatible 
descriptions of reality are possible in the first place. It is this key difference in their 
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respective conceptions of the task of philosophy that leads Davidson to opt for a layered 
view of science in which action explanations supervene upon event explanations and 
which instead leads Collingwood to opt for a bifurcated view of science in which action 
and event explanations articulate alternative conceptions of reality. The crucial difference 
here is that whereas in Davidson’s anomalous monism there is one conception of reality, 
the one in which the relata of an explanation are connected causally rather than rationally, 
which has ontological priority, in Collingwood’s neutral monism no conception of reality 
enjoys ontological pre-eminence. Davidson’s granting of ontological primacy to event 
explanations leads him to believe that Alexander’s principle, according to which “to be is 
to have causal powers”, applies to what occurs only in so far as it is described as an event 
or, to use the terminology of An Essay on Metaphysics, it leads to the belief that 
Alexander’s principle applies only to one sense of causation, the sense of causation 
employed in the natural sciences. Having hypostatised causation in a single sense 
Davidson is then forced to claim that if reasons are to have ontological or existential 
import they must be re-described as events. And having claimed this he then has to face 
the epiphenomenalist objection: “if reasons must be re-described as events in order to 
have causal efficacy they must remain epiphenomenal qua reasons”. Collingwood’s 
position is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism because the problem of 
epiphenomenalism arises from the espousal of a layered view of science in which the 
bottom layer determines one’s ontological commitments. Since Collingwood is not 
wedded to this conception of science,
20
 he does not inherit the problems associated with 
it. In fact, Collingwood explicitly condemns the layered view of science that underpins 
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anomalous monism as based on a logical error. Were he alive today he would probably 
respond to Davidson’s hypostatization of one conception of reality, the one captured by 
event rather than action explanations, or by the sense of cause employed in natural 
science, by pointing out that “reality is not a class concept”,21 and that to reify the 
explanatory framework of natural science is tantamount to overlooking ‘the ontological 
difference’ or conflating Being with beings.22 
Collingwood’s conceptual dualism does seem to provide an answer to the 
question “how is mental causation possible?” which genuinely sidesteps the most 
common problems that have cast doubt on the viability of non-reductive physicalism. It 
recommends itself to us on the grounds that it succeeds in doing justice to the common 
sense view that mind matters but without denying the aspiration of physics to provide a 
complete explanation of what happens. Why, then, is Collingwood’s neo-Kantian 
solution such a neglected alternative in the philosophy of mind? The answer seems to be 
that, in line with a Kantian rather than Lockean conception of the task of philosophy, 
Collingwood does not hand over to science the right to fix our ontological commitments. 
It is to these considerations that I turn in the next section. 
 
III 
Davidson’s anomalous monism has rarely been challenged from an idealist standpoint. 
The most common criticism against it is levelled from the standpoint of physicalism and 
attempts to show that a consistent physicalism is incompatible with Davidson’s non-
reductivist aims. In the following I suggest that since the internal inconsistencies in the 
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position of anomalous monism do not, by themselves, provide overwhelming reasons for 
choosing (reductive) physicalism over (conceptual) idealism, the latter should not be 
dismissed purely on the grounds that it does not fit within a naturalistic world view. 
Anomalous monism essentially involves three theses: (1) that mental events are 
causally related to physical events; (2) that singular causal relations are backed by strict 
laws and (3) that there are no strict psycho-physical laws.
23
 The reductivist seeks to show 
that anomalous monism is an impossible project because the concept of non-reductive 
physicalism is internally incoherent. This is the strategy followed by Kim whose 
philosophy provides an extended argument designed to expose the contradictions inherent 
in the idea of non-reductive physicalism.
24
 Kim argues that anomalous monism endorses 
an insufficiently strong physicalist claim, i.e. that Davidson’s monism is not 
uncompromisingly physicalist and that a satisfyingly robust form of physicalism is 
incompatible with Davidson’s attempt to grant causal efficacy to the mental. Let us 
consider these two arguments in turn. Kim attacks Davidson’s claim that anomalous 
monism is consistent with the claim that the mental supervenes or is dependent on the 
physical. As Davidson puts it “although the position I describe denies there are 
psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some 
sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might 
be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but 
differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect 
without altering in some physical respect”.25 Kim shows that in order for supervenience 
to capture a relation of dependence of the mental on the physical, rather than mere 
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covariation, one must give up premise (3) that there are no psycho-physical laws. 
Psychophysical dependence, as opposed to co-variation, requires type physicalism, i.e. 
the acceptance of bridge laws, and hence reductivism. Kim’s second argument is that the 
causal efficacy of the mental embedded in premise (1) violates the claim that physics can 
provide a complete explanation of reality. Reasons, for Kim, can be causally efficacious 
and still compatible with the demand for physicalist closure only to the extent that they 
are reduced to events, i.e. to the extent that they remain epiphenomenal qua reasons. A 
satisfyingly robust physicalism therefore requires one to relinquish premise (3) and to 
give an epiphenomenalist reading of premise (1), thereby abandoning Davidson’s hopes 
of defending the autonomy of the mental within a naturalistic framework.
26
 
Having argued that anomalous monism subscribes to a form of physicalism that is 
too weak to support the claim that the mental depends on the physical and that anomalous 
monism’s commitment to the causal efficacy of the mental violates a satisfyingly robust 
form of physicalism, Kim urges us to endorse reductive physicalism as the only live 
option available to us today. But whereas his claim that anomalous monism is internally 
inconsistent is based on philosophical argument, his view that dualism of any kind, 
whether ontological or conceptual, is not a defensible contemporary option, is not. This is 
not to say that Kim’s position is dogmatic in the sense that his preference for physicalism 
does not rest on evidence, but that the kind of evidence which seems to recommend the 
endorsement of reductive physicalism rather than conceptual idealism is evidence of an 
empirical rather than a priori nature.
27
 Or else it would be difficult to understand why the 
failure of the non-reductivist project should automatically lead one to rule out conceptual 
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dualism as a dead end. Kim speaks from the perspective of someone who has already 
accepted the truth of physicalism on empirical grounds and who is consequently 
unwilling to test this fundamental commitment in a dialectical process in which one’s 
initial premises may be reconsidered as a result of a priori reflection. In other words, Kim 
assumes that the method of natural science should fix our ontological commitments and 
is consequently unwilling to consider a solution (such as that offered by the conceptual 
idealist) which recommends itself not on empirical grounds, but on the basis of its ability 
to make sense of the perspective of common sense alongside the one of science. 
Kim’s efforts to demonstrate the incompatibility of physicalism and non-
reductivism are intended to persuade the reader to abandon the latter rather than the 
former. But since he exposes the inconsistencies inherent in non-reductive physicalism by 
using the tools of immanent critique, his arguments can be lifted almost intact to 
conclude that, in order to pursue the non-reductivist project, one must relinquish 
physicalism. I am here assuming, of course, that the genuine philosophical issue at stake 
in debates concerning the nature of the mind and whether or not there is such a thing as 
an autonomous science of the mental, is not whether physicalism is true or false, but what 
it means and what endorsing it entails. In other words, I am presupposing that the 
philosophical issue at stake in the reductivism/non reductivism debate is not the truth of 
physicalism but its conceptual status, just as what was at stake in the free will vs 
determinism debate was not the truth of either determinism or indeterminism but the 
issue of their compatibility or incompatibility. In fact, it is hard to see how else a 
philosophical argument could proceed, unless, of course, one were willing to assume that 
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philosophy is the mere under-labourer of science and that as such it ought simply to 
presuppose the truth of physicalism.
28
 
In sum, the reductivist challenge, as articulated by Kim, confronts anomalous 
monism with the claim that a) the causal efficacy of the mental threatens the demand for 
physicalist closure and b) that token or non-reductive physicalism cannot account for a 
relation of psycho-physical dependence. The idealist does not disagree with such 
considerations but offers a different way forward. In a nutshell the idealist suggests that 
in order to deliver the goals of anomalous monism (i.e. to reconcile the claims of 
practical and theoretical reason) one ought to reinterpret premise (1) in methodological 
terms. Premise (1), as we have seen, concerns the causal efficacy of the mental. Davidson 
interprets the claim concerning the causal efficacy of the mental in quasi-Cartesian 
interactionist terms and in order to avoid the problem of causal over-determination by 
mental and physical causes suggests that reasons are causes only in so far as they are 
described as events. Then, when faced with the accusation of epiphenomenalism, he 
claims that “events cause other events no matter how they are described”.29  
Reinterpreting premise (1) in methodological terms, as the kind of idealism 
espoused by Collingwood requires, entails altering one’s view of the nature of the 
relationship between actions and events and what is meant by the claim that “reasons are 
causes”. For Davidson reasons are causes in the same way in which sheep are mammals, 
i.e. reasons are said to cause events in the way in which sheep are said to suckle their 
young, i.e. not in virtue of being sheep but in virtue of being mammals. For Collingwood, 
by contrast, the relationship between reasons and causes is a distinction between concepts 
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or categories that determine a priori the kind of reality under consideration. Reasons may 
be said to be causes extensionally speaking (what is described as an event may also, 
under a different description, be an action), but reasons cannot be causes intensionally 
speaking because the concept of action is not a mark of the concept of event in the way in 
which being a sheep is part of the intension of the concept of mammal. This, I take it, is 
why Collingwood claims that the distinction between reasons and causes is a distinction 
between different meanings of the term “cause”, or a distinction between higher-level 
concepts, rather than a distinction between subordinate and superordinate species. 
Reinterpreting premise (1) in methodological terms and the reason/causes 
distinction as a distinction between meta-level concepts that determine a priori what kind 
of reality is under consideration involves abandoning the explanatory priority of 
physicalism without rejecting its aspiration to describe the whole of reality. This, it seems 
to me, is the distinctive advantage of the idealist solution over the reductivist one. If 
anomalous monism is inconsistent (and let us take this as given for the sake of argument), 
why should we turn to full-blown physicalism rather than idealism? Kim’s answer seems 
to be that we should be physicalists because the method of natural science should fix our 
ontological commitments. But there does not seem to be anything particularly 
philosophical about such an answer. The idealist’s answer is to suggest that we should let 
the methods of the sciences of mind and nature determine their respective subject matter 
or regional ontology, i.e. their conception of reality. The advantage of such a solution is 
that it does justice both to the claims of practical reason, according to which mind 
matters, and to the claims of theoretical reason, according to which there is a complete 
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physical explanation for everything that occurs. The idealist solution accommodates the 
claims of practical and theoretical reason in a way that reductivism will never be able to 
do. Idealism therefore recommends this solution to us on the grounds that it succeeds in 
making sense both of the folk-psychological view that mind matters, and of natural 
science’s claim to explanatory completeness. This seems to be a good philosophical 
reason for endorsing the idealist alternative, whatever else one might think about it. 
Collingwood’s alternative should therefore be of interest to those who believe that 
there is an autonomous science of the mind in the strong sense outlined by Davidson 
rather than in the weak sense advocated by functionalists, but who also remain 
unconvinced that Davison’s anomalous monism has the conceptual resources to defend 
the irreducibility thesis. Of course, one will choose to pursue the non-reductivist, rather 
than the naturalist agenda, only to the extent that one acknowledges the force of 
Davidson’s point about the normativity of the mental. It is those who construe the 
concept of the autonomy of the mental in the strong sense implied by anomalous monism 
rather than in the weak sense implied by functionalism that should take Collingwood’s 
neglected alternative seriously. Taking the latter seriously would also broaden 
considerably the domain of enquiry of what currently goes under the name of a 
philosophy of mind. Since the 1950s the philosophy of mind has been identified with a 
rather narrow set of assumptions within the philosophy of mind itself. It is perhaps time 
to broaden that subject matter and to acknowledge that the kind of conceptual idealism 
defended here is indeed a live option for us today. 
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 Fodor, J. (1974) mobilises these considerations in support of an argument for the autonomy of special 
sciences such as psychology, sociology and economics.   
3
 The “must” here is a transcendental must. 
4
 J. Kim (1995a) has convincingly argued that, at most, multiple realisation functionalism threatens 
psychology’s aspiration to be a methodologically autonomous science, not its aspiration to be scientific: the 
multiple realisation thesis espoused by functionalists entails only that inductive generalisations must be 
species specific, that the psychologist cannot extrapolate from one species to another, not that a scientific 
study of mental phenomena is impossible.  
5
 The argument against methodological unity was a central issue in debates in the philosophy of social 
science in the 1950s and 60s. Since Davidson such arguments have been construed in metaphysical rather 
than in methodological terms and have generally been pursued within the context of the philosophy of mind 
rather than in that of the philosophy of social science. 
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7
 For the epiphenomenalist objection see, Honderich, T. (1982) and (1984).  
8
 For Collingwood the science of mind, like logic and morality, is a normative or, as he puts it, a 
“criteriological” science. 
9
 I am here using the terms “regional ontology” and “subject matter” interchangeably to indicate that the 
distinction between regional ontologies is a distinction between domains of enquiry rather than a distinction 
between empirical classes. 
10
 See Collingwood (1933) and (1940). For an account of Collingwood’s conceptual idealism see D’Oro 
(2002). 
11
 This methodological debate was exemplified by W.H. Dray’s defence of the autonomy of rational 
explanations against C. Hempel’s argument for methodological unity (Hempel 1942). See Dray (1957) and 
1980) 
12
 See Kim, J. (1998), p. 59 ff. Here Kim is thinking primarily of contemporary participants in this debate, 
such as Lynne Rudder Baker (1993) and Tyler Burge (1993), but it is clear that he would think such 
objections also apply to Collingwood’s approach to the issue of mental causation. 
13
 The autonomy of mentalistic explanations has recently been defended by Scott Sehon (2000) and (1997). 
14
 See Crane, T. (2001) p. 60. Crane, like Kim, seems to have in mind both contemporary contributors to 
the debate about mental causation such as Lynne Rudder and Tyler Burge and supporters of the 
Collingwood-Dray thesis.  
15
 Similar objections are also raised by Marras, A. (1997). 
16
 For Collingwood’s discussion of how non-empirical or meta-level concepts may allow for extensional 
equivalence or overlap in empirical classes see Collingwood (1933). For the purpose of this paper I have 
ignored the debate concerning the continuity or otherwise between An Essay on Philosophical Method and 
An Essay on Metaphysics. I have discussed the latter in D’Oro (2002) and in Connelly, J. and D’Oro, G. 
(2005).  
17
 “Actions, Reasons and Causes” reprinted in Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford and 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1980. 
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